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The Tactual Ground, Immersion and the “space between” 
Clare Mac Cumhaill 
 
 
I ask whether figure-ground structure can be realised in touch, and if so, how. Drawing on the taxonomy 
of touch sketched in Katz’s 1925 The World of Touch, I argue that the form of touch that is relevant to such 
consideration is a species of immersed touch. I consider whether we can feel the space we are immersed in 
and, more specifically, the empty space against which the surfaces of objects, as I shall urge, ‘stand out’. 
Harnessing M.G.F. Martin’s account of bodily awareness and touch, I defend a positive thesis, pace 
Graham Nerlich on whose The Shape of Space (1994) I otherwise rely, both to defend the supposition that 
empty space can in principle be felt and to argue that touching empty space is not a mere species of 
absence perception. Along the way, I defuse a causal worry that might be thought to arise in the case of 
touching empty space. 
Key words: empty space; tactual experience; absence perception; figure/ground 
 
§0. The Puzzle and the Plan 
In his 1925 The World of Touch, David Katz introduces the notion of a tactual ground, 
remarking: “Rubin certainly would not object if we were to apply his very stimulating 
reflections concerning visual figure-ground, mutatis mutandis, to three-dimensional 
tactual structures”. He considers the experience of moving a hand over the bristles of a 
stiff brush: 
... you will feel a discontinuous space filled with points, a tactual figure...Between 
the points there is not “nothing” in a tactual sense, but rather empty tactual space 
that is not covered by matter. The tactual space is covered discontinuously with 
the tactual matter of the brush points; the space between forms the tactual 
ground. (1989, p.61) 
 
Merleau Ponty cites this passage in The Phenomenology of Perception, seemingly unfazed 
(2005, p.368).1 But there is reason to ask for some further gloss. The notion that empty 
space could act as a tactual ground is puzzling – how can empty space be felt? This is the 
main question I take up. A subsidiary one is to wonder how touch can realise 
figure/ground structure as Katz supposes. I answer it only in part, with reference to the 
peculiar case that Katz isolates – “the space between”. 
We can get a sense of how strange it might be to suppose that empty space can act as a 
tactual ground when we consider an assumption that may well be tacit in some 
discussions of the bipolarity of touch, namely that the body may be understood as the 
ground against which objects tactually ‘stand out’. Gallace and Spence (2014), for 
instance, urge: 
                                                        
1 See also the brief invocation in Scott (2001, p.157), Ratcliffe (2011, p.421), who cites Merleau 
Ponty’s formulation, and Sorensen (2008, p.128). 
 2 
As far as the tactile modality is concerned, common sense would appear to 
suggest that in order to recognize objects by touch alone, we need to separate 
them from their background. As soon as an object is placed in our hand, this is 
physically separated from its background…In this case, a neat separation 
between figure and ground is provided by a person’s ability to recognise their 
body as belonging to themselves. That is, bodily self-awareness might be 
considered as constituting the most important aspect of figure/ground 
segregation in touch” (ibid., p.22) 
 
But Katz’s notion of a ‘tactual ground’ unsettles this thought. If the body is conceived as 
the tactual ground against which objects stand out, how can empty space act as a tactual 
ground, the space the body qua ground occupies (or so we are supposing) itself being 
full, namely with the body?  
 
I detail and offer a partial defense of a thesis which is compatible with the assumptions 
that frame this worry, but which remove its force. I suggest that we can preserve the idea 
that the body figures as a ‘background’ for touch insofar as tactual awareness is 
constituted by bodily sensation and awareness in a sense to be made plain. But I propose 
too that we ought not to suppose that all episodes of tactual awareness necessitate the 
experience of contact or connexion with the body in the sense that would give rise to 
cutaneous experience, or to experience of resistance. And this is since, as I try to show, 
such an assumption, when suitably construed, can be found to invite skepticism about 
the possibility of our tactually experiencing the surfaces of objects qua surfaces, surely a 
datum for any theory of touch – we plainly feel the surfaces of things. But if feeling 
surfaces qua surfaces requires feeling whatever is outwith those surfaces, including 
sometimes empty regions, in some cases, tactual surface qua surface perception requires 
the tactual perception of empty space. The task of the paper is to offer a sketch of the 
nature of such perception.  
 
I argue that kinesthetic sensation and awareness in the absence of any noticeable 
cutaneous stimulation or experience of resistance is typically what is required to tactually 
experience empty space – here I draw on M.G.F Martin’s (1992, 1993) account of bodily 
awareness and touch which I introduce via a detour through Elizabeth Anscombe’s 
supposition that certain descriptions of bodily sensation are, in a sense to be explained, 
non-separable. But to this extent I disagree with Graham Nerlich on whose work I 
otherwise rely, both to motivate the idea that empty space can be felt as well as to make 
sense of the idea that perceiving empty space is not a mere species of absence 
perception, as might be supposed. Accordingly, as will become clear, the ‘method’ of the 
paper is an orchestrated conversation between these diverse authors, among others.  
 
In the first part of the paper (sections §§1-3), I explore whether some features of figure-
ground structure, as it is realised in the visual case, may be used as a comparative 
yardstick for touch and I uncover an ontological preference often implicit in 
considerations of touch that forecloses discussion of the possibility of ‘touching’ empty 
space – a preference that manifests itself in an emphasis on states of contact and events 
whereby contact is made. In the second part (§§4-7), through a brief consideration of 
silence, I spell out a causal worry that might be thought to arise in the case of empty 
space, and I defuse it, first by spelling out a somewhat naïve thought – our perceptual 
awareness of empty space is purely kinesthetic – and then by reifying that solution by 
placing a constraint on how what counts as kinesthetic awareness should be understood. 
The result is novel treatment of the possibility of our tactually experiencing empty 
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regions, and a defusion of the puzzlement which might otherwise attend Katz’s 
invocation of “the space between” as a tactual ground.  
 
 
 
§1. A Tactual Ground? 
 
In a later work, Gestalt Psychology, Katz evaluates the Gestalt principles he had applied in 
his own empirical investigations, rehearsing a series of Gestalt ‘laws’ – principles which 
organise the visual field into independent units (1951, pp.24-29).2  These are familiar: 
lines which enclose a surface tend to be seen as a unit, elements that are in close 
proximity tend to form groups, as do items that are similar, move simultaneously, have a 
“common destiny” or seem to “belong” together (p.27). These laws pertain to the 
determination of visual form.3  A form, however, is not yet figure.  A figure is a 
contrastive notion; it needs a ground. Kurt Koffka uses the idiom of unification and 
segregation to sort between these two – forms involve unification, figures require 
segregation (1935, p.129).  
 
This much understood the temptation is perhaps to ask questions of a genetic sort. One 
might ask by what processes the figure comes to be distinguished or segregated from the 
ground – this is a psychological question.4 Or it might be wondered what the conditions 
on the possibility of such segregation are. The Gestaltist project, however, is descriptive 
and phenomenological. Where a figure is apprehended, it is apprehended as segregated 
from the ground; this is just what it is to be a figure, namely to be so apprehended. 
Accordingly we might ask: In what ways can the figure be described as appearing 
segregated and distinct from the ground? Here I take my cue from Koffka. This is a 
warm up to our translation to the tactual case, for once we have a sense of how visual 
figure and ground differ, we can try to establish whether there is a case for such 
differentiation in the tactual realm. 
 
 
 
From Koffka (1935, p.181) 
 
Consider the figure above, borrowed from the Principles of Gestalt Psychology. We see a leaf-
like quadrangular figure within an oblong, or so things may be described. What does this 
description entail?  Says Koffka, that the larger unit does not appear to cease to be where 
the smaller unit is – it appears to stretch behind it. But, as such, he theorises, the part of 
the total field that coincides with the area of the leaf-like figure is “twice represented in 
our environmental field” (my emphasis, 1935, p.178); part of the field which is 
segregated from the rest of the field in one representation (the representation of the 
figure) is connected with it in the other (the representation of the ground). This he calls 
‘double representation’, an attendant feature of which is the attribution of the contour, in 
                                                        
2 It is worth noting that Katz did not regard himself as a Gestaltist. 
3 See Katz 1951, Chapter IX on attributes of forms. 
4 The Gestaltist goal is to articulate laws, not to uncover the processes by which laws are 
instantiated. For a recent example of the latter see Gilad et al (2014). 
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one representation, to the figure. The contour is thereby said to have a ‘one-sided 
function’ (ibid. pp.178-184).5  
 
This is one difference distinguishing the figure from the ground - the figure appears 
bounded, while the ground appears to stretch behind it. Other distinctions are 
descriptively marked like so: The figure typically appears ‘smaller’ and ‘shaped’, ‘thing-
like’ or ‘solid’, ‘harder’, and ‘more impressive’ (p.189). The ground, conversely, seems 
‘loose’, ‘stuff-like’ and ‘soft’; its parts seem less ‘articulated’ (p.187). Since some of these 
terms are tactually suggestive, our parallel is naturally encouraged. But how might it be 
drawn? 
 
Take first the requirement on double-representation. We can certainly make sense of one 
tactual medium enclosing another – cotton wool enclosing a jewel say, the contours and 
shape of which can be felt through the soft mass. Katz calls this volume touch. He offers a 
visceral example: a doctor palpates a patient’s body so as to feel the internal organs 
through the enveloping tissue. Or think, somewhat differently, of the princess and the 
pea - the pea is felt despite the bedding she feels it through. But if double-representation 
is a requirement on figure-ground articulation in touch as it is in the visual case, then it 
seems that mere enclosing or feeling through in this enveloping and voluminous sense is 
not yet enough. Why? For it seems that the place at which the pea is must also be 
represented, and tactually.  
 
An example helps spell this out. Imagine walking down a flight of stairs. Double-
representation, if it applied, would require not merely that one tactually represent the 
steps on which one treads and their tactile properties, but also that one represent the space 
at which the steps are. But if the steps are, as one might hope, impenetrable, then how? 
Prima facie, it seems that double-representation applies only unhappily in touch. So 
might the translation be secured in some other way?  
 
In addition to volume touch, Katz offers a characterization of ‘surface’ and ‘immersed’ 
touch (2009, pp. 50-52). Surface touch recalls surface colour, first detailed by Katz in the 
earlier The World of Colour and which, he tells us, offers “resistance to the gaze” (1935, 
p.51) – we cannot see through opaquely coloured surfaces. Analogously, surface touch 
involves tactually experienced resistance: “an obstacle bounded in space, presents itself to 
our consciousness” and we encounter “a continuous, unbroken palpable area….located 
at the surface of…the object” (1989, p.50). The surface in surface touch, then, is tactually 
opaque.  
 
Compare volume touch. When the jewel is felt through the cotton wool, one doesn’t tend 
to notice the surface of the cotton wool. But unlike the seeing of something through 
plane glass, the felt quality of the cotton qua intervening volume may itself ‘colour’ the 
felt quality of the surface of the thing felt – the ‘feel’ of the cotton wool may mask 
certain surface properties of the jewel. This suggests a sense in which volume touch may 
preclude surface touch, even while it might allow for the performance of what Avrum 
Stroll calls certain ‘surface operations’ (1988, p.24).6 A domestic example helps bring this 
out. Polishing is a surface operation that logically entails touch but which is best carried 
                                                        
5 Note this contrasts with duo-formation in co-ordination where the boundary has a two-sided 
function, see Koffka 1935, p.192. See also Casati and Varzi (1994, pp. 160-161) on what they call 
‘border’ attribution. 
6 As Stroll (1988, p.22) indicates, not all operations on objects are surface operations – that is, 
operations on surfaces. For example, slicing an object.  
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out under volume touch, say with a soft cloth. Nonetheless one feels the surface polished 
(pace Stroll who writes: “there is no way of touching a solid glass marble without touching 
its surface” (ibid. p.27). This gestures at one way in which volume touch may not wholly 
capture the kind of touch involved in feeling the tactual ground.  
 
Perceptual transparency or translucency involves spatial ordering - in volume touch the 
candidate figure, is felt through and so behind something else, the candidate ground. 
Typically, however, it is the ground that runs behind the figure, with the boundary or 
surface apprehended as belonging to the figure not the ground7 - recall, in vision the 
contour has a one-sided function. Further, transparency involves the ordering of two 
surfaces in three dimensions both of which occupy or are enclosed by the same space. But 
to be apprehended as a figure is to be apprehended as enclosed by a ground which, qua 
ground, is not apprehended as enclosed by anything else. Accordingly, to be a ground, the tactual 
surface of the enveloping medium must not merely be transparent in the sense of 
translucent, rather it must tactually evanescence entirely or become intangible. If so 
however, we are no longer considering volume touch, but rather a form of tactual 
immersion, or what Katz’s characterizes as immersed touch.  
 
Immersed touch occurs when one’s body (or part of it) is immersed in, or surrounded 
by, the substance felt – water say. But since the subject is immersed, there is no path 
through space that connects her to the substance felt. Rather, she is in it. Immersed touch, 
then, typically characterises a substance or stuff, not an object.8 The requirement that the 
subject be immersively in the tactually perceived substance or stuff such that the subject 
is not path-connected to the substance felt (recall, there is no path through space that 
connects her to the substance felt) requires that even in cases where the substance felt is 
comprised of parts that have surfaces – sand, for example, is comprised of tiny grains - 
there are no operations that the subject can perform on those surfaces through immersed 
touch – the subject cannot polish or scratch them for example. In this sense then 
immersed touch is entirely ‘figureless’, and, as such, seems apt to characterize the 
experience of the tactual ground, at least in the presence of a tactual figure. This is what I 
shall assume. 
 
Some examples. Consider reaching into a bucket of wet sand to find a sea-shell. The hard 
shell is the felt ‘figure’ to the tactual ground that the wet, uniform sand forms and in 
which the (reaching) subject is immersed. Somewhat differently, consider reaching into 
one’s pocket to retrieve keys – the keys are the ‘figure’ to the ground of the pocket-
lining, as well as the empty space that it encloses.9 Such enclosure brings back into view 
the “space between”. 
 
Let us suppose that ‘immersed touch’ involves tactual experience of surface-less 
substances in which the subject is. There are features of space that answer to that 
characterization.10 We are not path-connected to the space we are in and surface talk is 
likewise abject in the case of space. But this suggests some reason for thinking that the 
kind of tactual experience involved in touching empty space may also be conceived as a 
                                                        
7 Though see Casati and Varzi (1995) for counterexamples. 
8 Here ‘object’ picks out solid items that have a more or less permanent shape and which are 
mostly resistant to deformation and penetration. The notion of an object ‘of perception’ is 
naturally more embracive. 
9 Thank you to a referee for these lovely examples. 
10 As will become clear, this paper assumes a form of metaphysical substantivalism about space. This 
assumption is undefended here, but see Author X. 
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species of immersed touch, assuming, that is, that Katz’s taxonomy is correct and 
exhaustive.1 Still, even if we grant the notion of a tactual ground is best spelt out on the 
model of immersion – and this may be disputed - there is compelling reason to question 
the conceptual extension of immersed touch to empty regions, both in cases where empty 
regions act as the tactual ground (“the space between”), and more generally. Moreover, 
this is so even by Katz’s lights.  
 
On Katz’s specification of immersed touch, when resistance is removed so is the sensation or 
feeling (1989, p.51). But since we experience no resistance in moving through empty 
space, this should surely throw doubt on the possibility of our feeling it. Below I harness 
work by Graham Nerlich to dissolve this worry. As I go on to show however, Nerlich’s 
solution leaves the space in our vicinity impalpable, with consequences that we should 
want to waylay. For, as I explain in §3, the possibility of our touching surfaces is thereby 
undermined. In the reminder of the paper, I mostly focus on the possibility of our 
feeling empty space. 
 
 
§2.  Convoluted Paths 
 
Space in our vicinity is nearly Euclidean – it is almost flat. But, as Nerlich teaches, things 
might have been otherwise, with consequences for perception. He asks us to imagine a 
region of empty space of non-uniform curvature. Assuming it is not radically convoluted, 
such a region could, he says, in principle be felt. Accordingly, it is not the ontic nature of 
space that makes it intangible, but its geometric kind. In Time and Space, Barry Dainton 
explains how so, here designating such regions as ‘holes’: 
 
Like light rays, moving particles follow geodesics unless acted on by a force. 
Suppose you take a sizeable cube of soft foam rubber and move it into the hole. 
What would happen? Would it pass freely through? There are no material barriers 
to prevent it, just air and empty space. In fact, you would very likely feel a 
resistance. On entering the hole, the particles in the rubber will follow geodesic 
paths, and so initially they will converge then diverge. But this convergence will 
be resisted by the inter-particle bonds: you can imagine these electromagnetic 
forces as akin to elastic bands connecting the particles; as the particles try to 
converge, the bands have to stretch. Consequently, for the rubber cube to 
succeed in entering the hole a force needs to be supplied – to stretch the bonds –
and hence you feel resistance when pushing the cube forwards”. (2001, p.222) 
Dainton imagines that the valency that binds the particles that constitute the rubber are 
‘elastic’. To pass through the relevant region then the interparticle bonds would have to 
contract and stretch, which would require the application of force. Hence, if you were to 
attempt to force the cube through such a hole, you would feel resistance. Of course, our 
bodies are material too. But this being so, one might wonder: Does the same thought 
apply? Dainton supposes it would, and not only would we feel resistance exerted from 
without in such instances (in this case explained not by the presence of some material that 
resists our passage, but by the shape of the region), we would feel it too from within – 
“since stress tensions would be generated among your middle parts you would feel a 
distinctly queasy sensation” (ibid.). Nerlich, to whom this idea can be traced, provides a 
distinct analogy. In palpating non-Euclidean regions one would, he ventures, ache, though 
happily he also reassures: “if the curvature were slight, the rheumatism might be easy and 
bearable” (1994, p.39). Of course, such percepts are imaginary. But for Nerlich they trace 
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out and are grounded in the actual geometry of space. Just how will become plain as the 
paper progresses. But what should we suppose of the space we are in? 
Nerlich, it seems, implicitly treats the ‘feel’ of empty space on the model of immersion. 
In immersed touch, when resistance is removed so is the sensation (Katz 1989 p.51). 
Imagine walking against a blustery wind. One only feels the wind when one feels 
resistance to one’s movement - one cannot feel the air after it has stilled. On Nerlich’s 
understanding, the same is true in the case of near Euclidean space. Since our bodies 
need not change shape to be and move through the spaces in which we find ourselves, 
the resistance Dainton hypothesizes is absent; there is hence no queasiness, no aches. 
Consequently, the empty space in our vicinity cannot be felt.  
 
Significantly, however, Nerlich also places a cognitive constraint on the possibility of so 
feeling. Returning to the case of non-Euclidean holes, he conjectures: 
 
Let us suppose that the changes are noticeable and the effort to move into the 
hole perceptible too. Then we would feel non-Euclidean holes. They would be 
more or less obstructive some of them downright barriers to progress. We 
could palpate their contours and ache with the pressures of keeping or hands 
in the parts of deepest curvature (underlined emphasis added, ibid. p.39) 
 
Noticing then is, for Nerlich, a condition on feeling. But in the space in which we are 
there is nothing to notice – there is no convolution and hence no resistance. But since 
there is no resistance, there is no feeling. I will question this conclusion later. For the 
moment, the following may be noted. Recall that for Nerlich what grounds the 
possibility of feeling is the shape of space. But hence even in the near Euclidean case in 
which we are, we are in ‘contact’ with the ground of those grounds, namely, space itself, 
which in our vicinity is flat. And we are in contact with that ground by being in it. I return 
to this point later when I say a little more about the nature of the contact involved; I also 
reflect on kinds of feeling that Nerlich supposes would play a tactual role in the non-
Euclidean case, namely aches and pains. First, an initial way of making sense of the 
notion of ‘touching’ empty space.  
 
For Nerlich, we do not tactually experience the empty space in our vicinity. Perhaps then 
we can elucidate the notion of empty space as a ‘tactual’ ground, simply in terms of the 
absence of tactual experience, where the peculiar quality of the experience that is absent is 
tactual. This solution strikes me as intuitive. As I show in the next section however, there 
is reason to think that it invites skepticism about the possibility of tactually experiencing 
surfaces qua surfaces, surely something that a philosophical theory of touch ought to able 
able capture. 
 
 
§3. Holism, intervals and sensory atoms 
 
In §1, I listed a variety of ways in which figure and ground can be described as distinct. 
For Katz, as for the Gestaltists, our explanation as to why things so appear must be 
holistic (Katz 1951, p.vii, see also Ash 1998), where here holism contrasts with atomism. 
Take orientation in the visual case. 
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From Koffka (1935, p.185) 
 
As is often noted, the same figure may be seen as a diamond or a square depending on 
how it is oriented with respect to the ground (in this context construed as a ‘larger figure’ 
or framework). But on an atomistic treatment that emphasises only point-to-point 
stimulation, this datum cannot be honoured.11 How might a failure to appreciate holism 
shore up in touch?  
 
One obvious sense seems purely artefactual. Katz observes how the discovery of 
punctiform sense organs of the skin – “individual cutaneous sense spots” - were 
“realities to which one could cling; their isolated stimulation corresponded to the 
individual sensations themselves, the “atoms” of sensory experience” (Katz 1951, p.5).12 
But this emphasis is wedded to a further conceptual point, one that arguably reveals an 
ontological preference in our explorations of touch. 
 
A subject can touch or be touched. In The Catcher in the Rye, Holden Caulfield says of 
Jane: 
 
She was terrific to hold hands with. Most girls if you hold hands with them, 
their goddam hands dies on you, or else they think they have to keep moving 
their hand all the time, as if they were afraid they'd bore you or something. 
(2010, p.71) 
  
Holden’s hand is touched. But what can we say of the forms of hand-holding in which 
“most girls” are said to participate? One, it seems, is passive, the other active or haptic 
(see Gibson 1962). Both, however, involve sustained contact such that it is true over some 
interval that the subject is in a state of touching something. This is one ontological 
category that theorists of touch favour – states of being in content. Another is the events 
whereby those states come to obtain. Like noticing or winning a race, such events 
happen at a time.13 With this in mind, here is an attempt at isolating some phenomenology 
that I take to be a datum for an account of touch and which such an ontological 
predilection may dishonor, at least when coupled with a further assumption which I 
detail shortly:14  
                                                        
11 Christian Von Ehrenfels showed that a melody is not the mere sum of its notes. A tune, for 
example, is transposable -“the result may be that the original tune has not one single note in 
common with the transposed tune. Yet the tune itself is retained” (Katz 1951, p.35). See also Ash 
(1998). 
12 Such an emphasis shores up in discussion of what O’Shaughnessy called the “unit case” (1989, 
p.42) – momentary point contact. 
13 See Vendler (1957) and also the discussion of the verb categories Vendler identifies in  
Soteriou (2007) 
14 Given that most accounts emphasise active or haptic touch (after Gibson 1962), what follows 
might be thought something of a parody of the state of the art. Nonetheless, I persist in my 
 9 
 
Imagine the first time that Jane moves her hand through the darkness of the cinema to 
touch Holden’s. Imagine too that she succeeds. Intuitively, part of the tactual experience 
we imagine when we imagine what such an event must have been like to undergo, is the 
experience of touching the surface of something – a hand. What is involved in tactually 
experiencing the surface of something?  Prima facie, it might be thought that one need only 
reference the experiencing of the tactile properties of the surface felt  – Holden’s hand 
feels smooth and soft. But intuitively it involves more than that. For surely tactually 
experiencing the surface of something involves tactually apprehending it as a bounded 
thing, a thing beyond which, or outside of which, nothing, in a sense to be made clear, is 
felt. I pick up discussion of the superficial below. But meanwhile notice that a tactual 
parallel of the diamond/square case is suggested. 
 
Consider two intervals: One in which Jane moves through the darkness to make contact 
with Holden’s hand and another in which she holds his hand throughout the interval. 
And compare the phenomenology of the experience had at the instant in the interval 
whereby contact is made with an instant in the interval over which it is sustained. In the 
first, but not the second, Jane has a tactual experience of having come into in contact with a 
surface even though the tactual properties apprehended at that instant are the same. That 
is to say, it seems there is a phenomenal contrast in how things seem in both cases where 
this is not determined by stimulation at an instant.15 But if this is right then perhaps our 
account of the phenomenology of touching something, a bounded thing, must likewise be 
holistic, where the ground, as in the square/diamond case, plays a determining role. Here 
a requirement on the possibility of the ground playing a determining role is that we 
appeal to experience over an interval of time. This is one way in which I read the 
requirement for holism and notice that it gestures at a kind of ‘extensionalism’ about 
experience – the thought that experience is not limited to instants, a by no means 
uncontroversial assumption, though just how it is best accommodated I leave aside (see 
Phillips 2014, Hoerl 2013, especially p.383, fn,14). The second way brings into view the 
connexion between atomism and an emphasis on the cutaneous. For consider: if tactually 
experiencing surfaces qua surfaces involves experiencing objects as bounded in space, 
and if experiencing objects as so bounded involves feeling whatever is outwith those 
surfaces, including empty regions, then assuming that we can touch surfaces qua surfaces, 
we cannot fail to feel the empty space in our vicinity however that feeling is to be 
specified. Here the assumption of extensionalism staves off the general sceptical worry 
that applies to all experience of change and movement. But endorsing extensionalism 
does nothing to help specify the character of the tactual experience involved in perceiving 
the ‘outside’. This being the case, in trying to account for the phenomenology that is our 
datum, we should be looking for a mode of tactual awareness that does not involve our 
‘clinging’ to the sensory realities that only cutaneous connection can seem to make 
manifest. I hinted at a specification above. I can now be perspicuous. 
 
Earlier I used the phrase ‘nothing is felt’ without gloss but there is reason to think that 
there are tactual experiences of nothing, or, better, of no thing. C.B. Martin provides our 
parade case: 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
analysis since most theorists suppose that haptic touch must involve, in addition to kinesthesis, 
cutaneous stimulation. For example, Fulkerson (2011, p.493) writes:  “Haptic touch is an 
inherently active and exploratory form of perception, involving both coordinated movements 
and an array of distinct sensory receptors in the skin”. 
15 See Siegel (2010) for an account of the method of phenomenal contrast. 
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The blind feel for the absence of solid impediment to their progress. The 
sensation of their hand or limb passing through the space that is empty of such 
impediment is the desired perception of absence or emptiness in a perfectly 
straightforward way (1996, p.64). 
 
Such experiences may not display figure-ground articulation. Arguably too they have a 
certain intensional structure – they are feelings for or searches (see Ryle 1951). Still, as I 
explain §4, there is reason to think that they involve the tactual perception of emptiness. 
Before that it is worth highlighting an assumption that Martin makes which seems to 
unsettle the supposition that we earlier attributed to Nerlich. This brings into view our 
first modification of Nerlich’s insight, as well as helping to reify a little further the 
phenomenology that I have been supposing it is our task to theoretically capture. 
 
Martin tells us that the world “is divided into presences of….entities (individuals, 
properties, states or relations) and absences of them for the provision of their being and 
the limits of their being” (1996, p.57). But, as such, it might be thought that a 
requirement on the tactual experience of surfaces qua surfaces is tactual experience too 
of the outside in which they are not and against which they ‘stand out’ – this is the point I 
raised in excavating my datum and I owe it to Soteriou 2011.16 But if that is right then, 
contra Nerlich, we ought not to suppose that in traversing empty regions, there is an 
absence of tactual experience toto caelo, even in the near Euclidean case in which we are. 
Rather, it seems that we have some kind of tactual experience of absence. In the next section, 
I pursue this supposition, defusing a familiar worry that at once arises. For assuming that 
perception requires causation of an appropriate kind, how can one tactually perceive no 
thing?  
  
 
§4. Sky and Silence  
 
One theorist who has not neglected the tactual ground is Roy Sorensen. In Seeing Dark 
Things, he supposes that holes can be tactually apprehended. A materialist identifies holes 
with their ‘linings’, the material that ‘lines’ the hole (see Lewis and Lewis 1970), but 
Sorensen advocates a form of immaterialism. Holes are individuated by their linings but 
are made up of empty space. Hence to feel a particular hole, one much touch both the 
lining and the empty region lined (“feeling holes requires a holistic experience that 
encompasses transitions between the hole and its host” (pp.128-9)) This thought applies 
to surfaces too. Sorensen imagines a giant caressing the face of the earth, “much as a 
blind man explores the face of his wife” (p.130). Feeling the face of the earth isn’t feeling 
the sky. Rather, the sky is the tactual ground against which the face of the earth ‘stands 
out’. Accordingly, to feel the surface the giant must feel the sky. Assuming a causal 
constraint on perception however, we might wonder how. 
 
Sorensen grants the coherence of negative causation. Absences can be causes, he says; 
they are causally relevant and so are difference makers. Kukso (2006), on whom he 
draws, explains: When an entity makes a difference, a difference is made between two 
total states of the universe – the state in which the entity is present and the state in which 
it is absent. So “both the presence and the absence of the entity is required in order to 
establish its causal relevance” (p.32). How does this translate to the perceptual case? 
 
                                                        
16 The characterisation of counterfactual sensitivity below is also inspired by Soteriou (2011). 
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Take two possible states of a universe: a room in which a light is either on and off and 
suppose the switching on and off of the light makes a difference to a subject’s experience 
in the usual way - when it is on she sees light, when it is off darkness. Since this 
difference is explained by adverting to both the presence and absence of light, the absence 
of light, like its presence, is causally relevant to the character of the subject’s experience 
at a time. Of course, all of this assumes that the subject is counterfactually sensitive to the 
presence or absence of light. So how should we make sense of this notion, and how 
might it pattern in the tactual case? Here Sorensen’s take on silence illuminates.   
 
Silence can be heard, says Sorensen. There is something it’s like to hear silence. What’s 
more, we can hallucinate hearing silence: 
 
Consider a man who experiences auditory hallucinations as he drifts off to 
sleep. He “hears” his mother call out his name, then wait for a response, and 
then call again. The cycle of calls and silence repeats eerily. As it turns out, his 
mother has unexpectedly paid a late-night visit and is indeed calling out in a 
manner that coincidentally matches the spooky hallucination. The 
hallucinator is not hearing the calls and silence of his mother. (2008, p.269) 
 
A tactual parallel is not difficult to line up. A child skips her hand over park railings. In 
skipping her hand between the railings, she passes over gaps, the spaces between the 
railings, where, had something been present – some debris say - it would have been felt. 
But suppose the subject is caused to undergo an indiscriminable hallucinatory experience. 
In such cases, though the subject may undergo a phenomenally indistinguishable 
experience, she is no longer counterfactually sensitive to the possibility of feeling things 
at those regions – the gaps between the railings. Why? It is tempting to respond on the 
model of Sorensen: because the subject is hallucinating. But Soteriou (2011) invites us to 
puzzle further.  
 
Say I am asleep and surrounded by silence. I am nonetheless sensitive to the presence of 
sound at least insofar as some sounds may rouse me – if a door were to slam, I would 
wake up. Still, for the most part, I am typically insensitive to the absence of sound and this 
is so even if I may sometimes be woken by certain changes in my environment – a radio 
tuning out, my sleeping partner breaking off their embrace. Our intuitive response as to 
why positive presences (door slammings) or even changes involving positivities 
(decouplings) may unsettle while the silent presence of absence does not is that we are 
asleep. But this leaves open what the import of being awake is in the context of absence 
perception. I gesture at this below. First, a comment.  
 
What Soteriou’s reflection shows is that we cannot in general secure the causal relevance 
of absences merely on the basis of the subject’s being sensitive to certain properties at a 
time, as Kukso supposes. This is since in certain cases the relevant sensitivity is skewed 
in favour of the positive. However, for the theorist invoking negative causation, recall, 
the effect must be symmetrical. But this in turn explains why the orthodox appeal to 
hallucination so as to explain failures of counterfactual sensitivity is inadequate. Why so? 
Because we don’t in general tend to think that the possibility of a subject undergoing 
distinct experiences at a time is best explained by the fact that the subject is not 
hallucinating. Rather it seems natural to think that this possibility is explained by the fact 
that the subject perceives perceptible properties and objects that are only contingently 
located in space and time and which only contingently have those properties. Different 
objects and properties might have been perceived. But on this understanding, 
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counterfactual sensitivity is not, after all, a monadic dispositional property of a subject - a 
property that is manifest whenever a subject not hallucinating. Rather it is a relational 
dispositional property, a property that is manifest whenever a subject is perceptually related 
to regions at which perceptible properties and objects are only contingently found.  
 
On this understanding then the subject’s being consciously aware of regions explains her 
counterfactual sensitivity – her experience would have been distinct were different 
properties present or absent at those regions. Thus: because the child feels the gaps 
between the railings, leaves, twigs or any other autumn detritus, had it been located there, 
would have been felt.  But this just seems to recapitulate our worry. For how can we be 
tactually aware of such regions?  
 
Return to the wakeful. As Sorensen emphasizes, a shell-shocked solider can wonder if he 
is hearing silence or has gone deaf. For prima facie the phenomenology of being deaf 
and of hearing silence are the same.17 Notice, however, that similar problem does not 
arise in the case of touch. A wounded solider cannot wonder if he is numb or touching 
empty space. Why so? In the course of his exposition, Sorensen quotes from H. H. Price. 
 
We are never destitute of tactual data; and very rarely (if at all) of auditory 
ones, for what we call ‘silence’ can be heard (1922, p.39, quoted in Sorensen 
2008, p.270) 
 
Sorensen notes that “What?” has been scribbled in the margin of his copy of Perception. 
The earlier reader had baulked at the latter claim. But the former provides the resources 
to defuse the causal worry. Recall Martin’s confidence:  
 
The blind feel for the absence of solid impediment to their progress. The 
sensation of their hand or limb passing through the space that is empty of such 
impediment is the desired perception of absence of emptiness in a perfectly 
straightforward way (1996, p.64). 
 
But if we are never tactually destitute, at least when awake and typically moving – as 
deVignemont (2014, p.3) notes “complete stillness can make you lose your body, so to 
speak” – then perhaps, as Martin suggests, tactual sensation or feeling can ground the 
relevant awareness. I explore this thought in more detail in §5-6. First I sketch how it fits 
into the picture so far painted.  
 
We have supposed that empty space can be tactually perceived so long as a subject is 
counterfactually sensitive to regions where tactual material, were it present, would have 
been felt, where the relevant counterfactual sensitivity involves conscious awareness of 
those regions. This, however, need not involve appeal to negative causation, for even in 
the absence of tactual material, the subject is not left tactually “destitute”. Rather, the 
subject feels, in a sense to be explained, its body pass through empty regions and hence 
feels, in a perceptual sense, those regions. I defend this claim below. Notice, however, that 
this gives us additional reason to dispute Nerlich’s supposition that the space in our 
vicinity is not felt. For arguably, we feel it, as Martin means to suggest, by moving through it. 
But so too does Nerlich give us reason to suppose that Martin’s analysis is mistaken in 
conflating the perception of the absence of material with the perception of empty space. 
For although we can pass through regions of space that are empty of tactile material, so 
                                                        
17 See Phillips (2013) for a critique of this assumption. 
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too does the shape of space make a difference to our passage. For Nerlich, recall, what 
grounds the possibility of feeling space is its shape, granting that even in the near 
Euclidean case in which we are we are ‘in contact’ with those grounds. But we can now 
say too in what sense that ‘contact’ should be understood. 
 
Merely being immersed or ‘in’ space, as we are when we are asleep, is not enough. Rather 
we must be consciously aware of space and moving through it.18 But if such awareness is 
grounded in bodily sensation through movement, as Martin supposes, then Nerlich’s 
supposition that space in our vicinity cannot be felt should surely be revisited. For it 
seems that what Nerlich has mistakenly emphasised, on the model of contact, is cutaneous 
activation – the feelings or sensations that arise through deformation of the skin. 
Granted, in moving through empty space this aspect of tactual experience is noticeably 
absent. But this does not yet mean that empty space cannot be felt. This is what the 
positive proposal I now detail allows. 19 In §6, a refinement of the view is offered. 
 
 
§5. A positive proposal 
 
Earlier I noted a theoretical emphasis on contact or connection. Yet touch, as a modality, 
is heterogeneous, perhaps even too heterogeneous (see Ratcliffe 2011 DeVignemont and 
Massin 2015) – it encompasses the sub-modalities of proprioception and kinesthesia, as 
well as cutaneous stimulation. But such heterogeneity, when assumed - rather than 
skepticism about the unity of touch  - is key to our solution. 
 
In passing through empty space, there is an absence of cutaneous activation, for no thing 
is touched. So here we can agree with Nerlich – there is an absence of this aspect of 
touch. Nonetheless, one experiences empty space kinesthetically. But since kinesthetic 
sensation is a species of tactual sensation, or so we are assuming, we are thereby tactually 
aware of empty space. This is what my solution proposes and, in its favour, it explains 
both Nerlich’s intuition concerning the space we are in and his cognitive condition on 
feeling.20 For arguably, we only notice cutaneous activation.  
                                                        
18 See also Sorensen who writes: “a hand suspended in the empty space of the hole does not feel 
the hole” (2008, p.128). Note that the notion of conscious awareness that is invoked here is 
supposed to contrast with the kind of putative awareness of space one might have in cases of 
hallucination. As I have explained, being consciously aware of space is what explains 
counterfactual sensitivity in the non-hallucinatory case. 
 
20 The proposal I detail in this paper adverts primarily to kinaesthetic experience or experience of 
movement, so as to make conceptual room for the possibility of tactual awareness of empty 
space. This might suggest that I endorse what Anton Ford (2016) has recently designated as a 
corporealist philosophy of action – one which supposes that actions are to be identified with bodily 
movements. In fact, a bare corporealist treatment of action will have difficulty accounting for 
what I take to be a datum in this paper – namely, that we experience our bodies as bounded, 
something that is spelt out in the latter half of §6. A full-dress account of the proposal offered 
here would develop a philosophy of action that can make sense of this datum, and also explain 
how the simple episodes of movement that I am invoking are best understood as parts of wholes 
which explain why the subject is moving at all (to wit: she is acting). For example, in walking to 
the table to pick up a book that I want to reference in this article, I traverse an empty region. The 
argument of this paper is that the empty region traversed is tactually apprehended through 
kinaesthetic experience, suitably understood.  
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So how compelling is this somewhat naive view? I argue we should embrace it, though 
only once suitably understood.  
 
The proposal builds on a cleavage between kinesthetic and cutaneous activation. 
Empirically, however, in addition to receptors in muscle spindles, cutaneous activation 
contributes to kinesthesia in the form of information from skin stretch. For example, 
stretch of skin during flexion of the elbow can provide information about movement of 
the forearm (see Proske and Gandevia 2009). I leave this aside. Much more important is 
a conceptual point. What we call kinesthetic sensation is the sensation of movement.  Take 
Martin’s example of the blind passing their hand through an empty region. What they 
feel he says is “the sensation of their hand or limb passing through the space that is 
empty of such impediment” and this, he says, “is the desired perception of absence of 
emptiness in a perfectly straightforward way”. But how should we understand the role 
that such sensation plays in grounding perceptual awareness? And what should we make of 
the fact that it is kinesthetic or a sensation of movement? Harnessing a distinction drawn by 
Elizabeth Anscombe, I take up these questions below.  
 
 
§6. Reification and Anscombe’s Distinction. 
 
In responding to one Mr. Braybrook in her 1962 ‘On Sensations of Position’, Anscombe 
writes: 
 
If we are considering an expression of the form “sensation of X”, we need to ask 
whether the words “of X” are a description of the sensation content, or whether 
the sensation has some different content and X is what produces or goes along 
with it etc. The sensation of going down a lift is a sensation of sudden lightness 
and as it were of one’s stomach lurching upwards; “of going down a lift” is not 
an internal description of the sensation (1981, p.72) 
 
With this in mind, take Martin’s description of the blind whereby “the sensation of their 
hand or limb passing through the space that is empty of such impediment is the 
perception of an empty region”.  We might ask: Is what follows the “of” in this sentence 
– the phrase underlined - an internal or external description of the sensation, that is, of 
how it feels? I consider the identity claim at the close of this section. First I spell out 
Anscombe’s distinction as I understand it. 
 
External descriptions of sensation reference whatever event is conceived as ‘producing’ 
or ‘going along with’ the occurrence of the sensation, but where it is assumed that the 
relevant sensation can be described some other way.  For example, in the case of the lift, the 
sensation of “going down in a lift” can be described some other way – as a sudden 
lightness, the lurching of one’s stomach upwards. Such descriptions are internal, while 
“going down in a lift” is an external description. The question is: Can the sensation that 
attends the passing of one’s limb through space be otherwise described? That is, can we 
describe how it feels to move one’s hand or limb through an empty region without 
referencing the event that, on the face of it, produces or goes along with the relevant 
feeling? What would that require?  
 
One requirement would be perhaps that the relevant sensation or feel could vary in its 
quality or intensity. Feelings of lightness, for example, seem to be describable in terms of 
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their onset or strength, just as a headache can. But it seems odd to suppose that 
sensations of movement can be so described. Rather we are apt to describe the movements 
themselves – one may move suddenly say, quickly, or with effort.  Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, no reference would need to be made to things ‘outside’ the 
experiencing subject. But of course Martin’s description does refer to something outside 
the experiencing subject; just a lift is something outside the subject, so is the space in 
which the subject is and moves through, at least once suitably understood. I return to 
this point below. 
 
Ostensibly, then, it seems that the relevant sensation - the feeling of passing one’s limb 
through an empty region - cannot be otherwise described. Might this lead one to suppose 
that there are no sensations of movement after all? This is not what Anscombe says. 
Rather her claim is negative. She claims that sensations of movement are not separately 
describable. They cannot be described independently of a description of the event with 
which they unfold. But, perhaps surprisingly, this suggests that we should resist reading 
Martin’s “of X” as an external description of the sensation felt.  
 
Sensation that can be externally described can be described some other way.  Arguably that 
is why it is even possible to speak of such sensations as being produced or going along 
‘with’ other events – those that ostensibly produce the sensation. For it might be thought 
that implicit in such talk is the reckoning that it is possible to cleave apart the sensation 
from the event ‘with which’ it putatively ‘goes along’. But in the case we are considering 
there is no ‘production’ or ‘going along with’ if by that it is assumed that there is some 
sensation that it is possible to speak of as produced by that event or as going along with 
it, where the it is separately describable. Rather the feel of passing one’s hand through 
space cannot be separately described at all - one can only describe the phenomenology by 
describing the event. But since the description is in this sense non-separable, nor can it be 
external.  
 
In what follows I take it that Anscombe’s observation is right so far as descriptions of 
the phenomenology go. Still, there are two features of her account as I have described it, 
that need further gloss: non-separability and internality 
 
Anscombe allows that there are non-separable internal descriptions of sensations. But if the 
internal/external description distinction spins on the possibility of sensations being 
separately described (viz. as being either internally or externally described), then where 
such sensations are only non-separably describable, why class the relevant descriptions as 
internal at all? Anscombe does not, it seems, speak to this issue. Here then is one 
suggestion:  
 
Sensation is felt ‘within’ our body even while non-separately describable. Hence the 
legitimacy of designating the relevant descriptions of sensation as internal – as 
descriptions of what is felt to be within one’s body. Though I have cast this in the spirit 
of Anscombe, here I follow M.G.F. Martin (1992, 1993). 
 
For Martin, sensations that are bodily have a certain character – they are felt to be ‘within’ 
one’s body. For sensations to be felt to be ‘within’ however, a subject must be aware too 
of a region of space ‘without’ the body where sensation cannot be felt. Call this region 
unfelt space. Space, then, enters into the character of bodily experience since in 
experiencing bodily sensation as ‘within’ and hence – as I am using the term – as bodily, a 
subject experiences her body as bounded and so as occupying a space that extends 
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beyond it, space which is not felt in the same way. This is a structural requirement on 
experiencing sensation as ‘within’. How might this apply to kinesthetic sensation and 
awareness? 
 
In kinesthetic awareness, one is aware not only of one’s body but of its moving. While 
proprioceptive awareness involves awareness of the spatial position of one’s limbs, 
kinesthetic awareness involves more than this. It involves awareness of the displacement of 
one’s body and hence of a region through which movement occurs. But, of course, 
whatever awareness one has of such a region, it cannot be through bodily awareness, for 
otherwise the distinction between ‘within’ and ‘without’, necessary for the awareness of 
bodily movement, would collapse.21 I spell this point out in more detail in the section 
that follows. 
 
This accounts for the internality of the description of the sensation. How can we make 
sense of the notion of non-separability? For Anscombe, inseparability is a relation between 
descriptions. When one describes how one feels, one describes an event or state of affairs, 
but not one that can be found to ‘go along with’ or ‘be produced by the event’ such that 
the sensation can be described some other way. For when sensations are genuinely non-
separably describable, there is no other way. I suggest we can apply this to the present 
case as follows: 
 
When a subject is touching something, there is a way its body is. And, likewise, when it is 
touching nothing. But, as such, it might be thought that what it is like for the subject to be 
in that state is not separably describable from a description of how her body is disposed 
with respect to that thing or to things that are relevantly like that thing.22 I suggest that 
M.G.F. Martin’s template model of touch helps make sense of this. 
 
For Martin, feeling how things are ‘within’ one’s body provides for awareness of how 
things are ‘without’ the body. The structural feature of bodily awareness detailed above 
then also provides for touch. An example. Consider the sensation one feels in one’s 
fingertip when it presses against the rim of a glass. It feels, says Martin: 
 
…to be within one’s body and at the limits of one’s body, at the skin. One also 
feels one’s fingertip to be pressing against an object, one which resists the further 
movement of one’s finger down through the rim. (1992, p.204) 
 
Here the spatial location the sensation is felt to have - it is felt to be within one’s fingertip 
– provides for awareness of that which is outwith one’s body – the rim – the material 
properties of which resist one’s movement. In experiencing resistance then, one tactually 
apprehends those properties, for one presses and one’s finger is not merely deformed but 
does not move. In this way, bodily awareness is said to provide for touch or to be a form of 
tactual awareness (Richardson 2013).  
 
                                                        
21 This then is consistent with Anscombe’s insistence that knowledge of movement is non-observational. 
This is since the within/without distinction that is required for experience of sensation to be bodily, to be 
felt as within, pertains to the structure of the experience and not the content. Cf. Harcourt 2008.  
22 A full-dress account of such tactual descriptions – descriptions as to how things tactually appear – would 
allow for such comparisons. For example, we might say that feeling a nut on one’s palm is like feeling a 
pebble on one’s palm. I leave this complication aside. Note too that there is nothing it is relevantly like to 
feel empty space. 
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This is one case Martin has us consider. Here’s another. One rests one’s five fingers on 
the rim of the glass. In this case, one’s body is a template insofar as the spatial 
configuration of one’s body mirrors or matches the spatial configuration of the glass with 
which one is in contact. But in this sense awareness of how one’s body is arranged in 
space is concomitantly an awareness of a distinct mind-independent property – not the 
nature of the materiality of the glass but its shape.  
 
Martin then implicitly sorts between two distinct modes in which one can have 
perceptual tactual awareness, through23 bodily awareness, of the external world.24 First, 
one can have awareness of the shape of an object through awareness of the spatial 
configuration of one’s body. Second, one can have awareness of the material 
composition of an object or, minimally of its materiality, through the experience of felt 
resistance in trying to pass through or manipulate it in some way. The temptation is 
perhaps to conflate these two, but once it is realised that impenetrability, a property of 
things, does not yet entail experience of resistance (Katz ibid. p.51), they can be cleaved 
apart - after all, one may lightly place one’s fingers on the rim.25 But with these two 
modes distinguished, the conceptual resources for ‘touching’ empty space can, I think, be 
assembled, and, at least in certain places, Martin’s text can be read as sympathetic to this 
thought. For instance: 
 
We are embodied in a world which contains potentially many other bodies. We 
can come into contact with other bodies, and they impede our movement and 
distort our shape. Such physical impingement on us is reflected in the awareness 
we have of our bodies. One is aware when one’s movement is impeded, and 
when one’s skin is in contact with objects or distended by them. In being aware 
of one’s body, sensing how it is disposed, where it can and cannot move, and 
where one has sensation, one can attend to the objects in virtue of which these 
are true. One measures the properties of objects in the world around one against 
one’s body. So in having an awareness of one’s body, one has a sense of touch 
(my emphasis, ibid., p.203) 
 
Granted on first reading, it might seem that Martin’s template model of touch applies 
only to objects, but if what we are supposing is on the right track, the scope of the model 
is wider. For consider: By sensing where one’s body can and cannot move, one can attend 
to the objects in virtue of which this is so. When we freely move, however, we do so in virtue 
of our moving through space that is “empty of impediment”, space which, as I claim, we 
are tactually aware of in having non-separably describable bodily experience.26 But, if 
correct, this finally allows us to make sense of the identity claim that C.B. Martin urges. 
The sensation of one’s hand passing through empty space is, he says, the desired 
perception of empty space. And this is since, we can now conclude, awareness of the 
movement of one’s body through space – kinesthetic awareness - is a form of tactual 
awareness of that region, where here the relevant awareness is understood to be bodily.  
 
                                                        
23 See Richardson (2013) for an explanation of how to read ‘through’ here. 
24 Critics of the template model have perhaps conflated these.   
25 Critically the claim here is not that there is no resistance - the rim must activate cutaneous pressure 
receptors in order to be felt - but only that what Katz calls active resistance is not experienced. Active 
resistance is the phenomenal marker of the presence of impenetrability and is felt whenever pressure is 
exerted beyond a certain threshold.  
26 As will become clear shortly, the ‘in’ here should not be read as suggesting that the relevant sensations 
play an epistemic role that tell one that one is moving through empty space.  
 18 
So let us revisit Nerlich in light of all this. Recall that the kinds of bodily sensations that 
Nerlich supposes would render the contours of non-Euclidean spaces sensible or felt are 
aches and pains (“if the curvature were slight, the rheumatism might be easy and 
bearable” (1994, p.39) But such sensations are often cast as intransitive insofar as they 
don’t represent one’s body as being some mind-independent way. As Richardson (2013) 
explains: 
 
Take, for example, a headache. There is no mind-independent way my head 
seems to be, just in having a headache. In virtue of having a headache, I am not 
in a state that represents my head as being some mind-independent way. There is 
a less committal description of the phenomenal character of this sensation than 
one that refers to a state representing a mind-independent quality, such as being 
damaged. One less committal description would just be that my head hurts 
(p.141). 
But Nerlich’s ‘tactual’ sensations are no more committal. It is hence not clear why those 
feelings should serve to ground genuine tactual perception rather than some unspecified 
kind of bodily experience that one is in regions that are variably curved. Genuine tactual 
experience however requires transitive sensation – sensation that is committal about the 
mind-independent way one’s body is and hence, the world.  
 
Nerlich, however, implicitly endorses a model of tactual experience on which the 
transitivity of tactual sensation can seem to be accommodated by sensations which are 
nothing more than signs of, or for, the presence of something outwith the body – something 
that can be externally described and with which those internally describable sensations 
(aches and pains) ‘go along’. But, on such a model, the mind-independent way one’s 
body is arrayed in space, even in cases where it is touching nothing cannot yet be recruited to 
explain tactual phenomenal character. And this naturally explains why, for Nerlich, the empty 
spaces in our vicinity cannot be felt. We sail through empty regions in our vicinity, 
without pain and without queasiness. But if what I have argued is on the right track, this 
does not yet mean that empty regions are not felt, at least once suitably understood. 
 
In the penultimate section, I consider an exegetical worry that might be thought to arise 
from my use of the M.G.F. Martin’s template model, as well as an objection. 
 
 
§7. Polo Mints and Unfelt Space 
 
For Martin, objects and the space in which they are are visually experienced in the same 
way – his idiomatic example is the polo mint. One sees the mint and the hole. But bodies 
and the space in which they are located are not experienced in the same way. Why? 
Because to experience one’s body as bodily one has to experience it as located in a space 
which one does not feel in the same way.  Given that Martin’s account shows how touch is 
constituted by bodily awareness however, this might be lead to the following mistaken 
extrapolation: Objects and empty space are visually apprehended in the same way – they 
are visible. But objects and empty space are not tactually apprehended in the same way – 
objects are felt, empty space is not.27 
 
                                                        
27 This seems to be the assumption of Scott (2001, p.157) 
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In fact, Martin does not speak to this issue. He urges only that touch is grounded in 
bodily sensation and that bodily sensation involves awareness of space without the body, 
space that is not felt in the same way. Here, of course, he means ‘feeling’ in a bodily 
sensation sense, not in a perceptual sense. Why so? For if one did feel a region in this 
bodily way, one’s body would be felt to extend to that region. Granted, it might be 
insisted that the examples Martin appeals to invite this exegetical parallel - viz. comparing 
the visual experience of a Polo mint with tactual experience of an empty glass - but 
emphasising this commonality seems to me to miss a critically relevant point: the space 
outwith the body, awareness of which grounds the within/without distinction, is neutral 
between objects and empty space – it is simply unfelt space, space that is not felt in a 
bodily sense. But given that bodily sense provides for touch this does not preclude 
feeling empty regions. When? As I have urged, when moving through them. That this is so 
however brings into view a further, somewhat intuitive worry. 
 
When one’s body moves through empty space, the relevant space is not, after all, empty 
since, on the view I have been defending, in order to feel empty space, one must feel 
one’s body to extend to that region – this follows from the template model. But, if so, 
the relevant region is full!  
 
This echoes the concern at the opening of the paper: If the body is conceived as the tactual 
ground against which objects stand out, it is hardly surprising that we may have difficulty 
in appreciating in what sense empty space may act as a tactual ground, the space the body 
qua ground occupies (or so we are supposing) itself being full, namely with the body. But 
we now have the conceptual resources to address this assumption. 
 
The body acts as the background in touch – this is what the template model teaches. 
However, qua background, the body can nonetheless yield tactual perceptual awareness 
of empty regions which, in certain cases – specifically those of surface qua surface 
perception – can thereby act as the tactual ground against which a tactual figure may 
stand out. Importantly here the requirement for extentionalism must be recalled. In order 
to be tactually aware of empty space, one must move through it, which takes time. Hence, 
even while it may be true that when moving through a certain empty region, one’s body 
fills a sub-part of that region at an instant, it is not true, at every moment within the 
interval through which one traverses a region, that one fills the entirety of that region. 
Otherwise, one would not be moving through it.28  
 
 
§8. In nuce 
 
I have suggested that one can be tactually aware of empty space even in the absence of 
noticeable cutaneous sensation, where this involves moving through it. I provided some 
motivation for thinking that this must be so. Many of the surfaces we meet with in touch 
are met with through empty space but tactually apprehending the superficiality of those 
surfaces, and not merely the tactile properties that those surfaces have, involves 
apprehending the empty space ‘outside’ those surfaces, regions where those things are 
not.  
 
                                                        
28 It is important to note that relative velocity will also play an important role here. For if 
movements are progressively slowed down, the sense of movement will transmogrify into a sense 
of changed bodily position (compare the first and second hands of a clock). 
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At the outset I iterated a number of features of figure-ground structure in vision that 
might be found to shore up in touch. I listed a series of descriptive terms, some of which 
encourage the parallel - figures seem ‘solid’, ‘hard’, ‘impressive’; grounds appear ‘soft’ and 
‘loose’ – and I explained how such a translation might be effected. While surface touch 
seems apposite for figures, immersed touch best captures the notion of ground. In the 
case of empty space, however, I urged that we appeal both to the absence of surfaces at 
those regions and – drawing on Nerlich - to properties of those regions themselves, 
namely their shape.  
 
In closing, however, I submit that some resistance to this proposal is likely to remain (if 
not, I hope trenchantly so!) This is not only because of the reliance on a certain 
metaphysics of space, but just as a matter of semantic principle. After all it might be 
objected, very naturally I think, that it just doesn’t flow from what we mean by “touch” 
that we can touch empty space.  
 
I think we should admit this much. We should happily grant that empty space cannot be 
“touched”, where here the notion of to “touch” something captures the Nerlichean 
intuition that there is no experience of cutaneous contact with the body nor active 
resistance, however this is to be explained. But our words are not monolithic, and the 
word “touch” can admit numerous uses, some less covert than others. Katz writes that 
the “space between” is not “nothing” in a tactual sense. If what I have argued is on the 
right track, I think we can be less circumspect: empty space is felt.  
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